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Abstract Negotiations are known to proceed differently across cultures. A realis-
tic agent model of international negotiations has to take cultural differences into 
account. This paper presents an agent-based model that tackles this challenge. The 
context is a trade game where commodities with a hidden quality attribute are ex-
changed. The negotiation model uses the ABMP negotiation architecture. It ap-
plies a utility function that includes market value, quality preference, and risk atti-
tude. The indices of the five dimensions of Hofstede’s model of national cultures 
are used, in combination with agent’s group membership and societal status, to 
differentiate negotiation behavior by adaptation of weight factors in the utility 
function and ABMP parameters. The paper presents test runs with synthetic cul-
tures and a set of actual national cultures. The present version of the model helps 
to understand behaviors in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s 
dimensions can be used to generate culturally differentiated agents. 
Introduction 
Bargaining practices differ across the world. Multinational companies sometimes 
work with different price lists for different countries: in order to sell at the same 
price, the selling company needs to adapt its offer to the varying bargaining prac-
tices. A single piece of advice about how to bargain, or a single model to describe 
bargaining, are obviously not valid across the world unless culture is taken into 
account. 
‘Culture’ is a notion with many meanings, some of which are contested in some 
disciplines. However, the leading paradigm today is widely accepted and used in 
both practice and academia. According to it, culture refers to the unwritten rules of 
society. It is a phenomenon that is specific to a group, not to an individual. It is 
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transmitted in early youth through example and education. As a result its stable 
across centuries in spite of huge changes in environment and technology. Cultural 
differences show no signs of diminishing in the Information Age. 
Within the literature various basic dimensions can be found according to which 
societies differ from one another. Of these, the most widely used is Hofstede [1], 
[2]. His work is accessible, sparse, and based on a very large, very well stratified 
sample that continues to give it great explanatory value. No other model matches 
society-level variables so well to date [3].  
This paper describes an agent-based model for bargaining in the context of 
trade and focuses on cultural adaptation of negotiation process parameters. The 
agents follow common sense strategies such as maximizing utility, seeking good 
quality, and minimizing risk, but they also have models of how to behave in an 
appropriate manner. The latter models are based on Hofstede’s five dimensions of 
culture. A cultured agent-based model of bargaining offers several promises. It 
can help understand the dynamics of international negotiations in trade. It could 
also serve as a training tool for aspiring international traders.  
The paper first briefly introduces Hofstede’s model of five dimensions of cul-
ture. Next, the ABMP (Agent-Based Market Place, [4]) negotiation model that we 
adopt is presented. We show how this model can be used in agent-based simula-
tions. We also discuss the limited subset of negotiation situations that are consid-
ered in this article. In the third section we link culture and negotiation by describ-
ing the influence of each of Hofstede’s dimensions of culture on negotiators’ 
practices and preferences. This section sets the scene for the presentation of the 
rules for our cultured agents in the fourth section. Section five shows example 
runs with the model on imaginary cultures that have extreme values on one of the 
Hofstede dimensions and average values on the other four. Section 6 presents re-
sults of test runs for a set of actual countries. Finally we discuss the model and 
how to proceed, since this model forms the basis of future research and tools. 
Hofstede’s Five Dimensions of Culture 
Human societies have found a different patterns of response to the problems of so-
cial life. In some, groups are permanent and close-knit while in others, group 
membership is volatile and voluntary. In some, leadership style is usually auto-
cratic and in others, participative. Research has shown and repeatedly confirmed 
that basic tendencies to deal with a few central issues of social life are stable 
across the generations in societies [2]. They are, because they are instilled into a 
society’s members from birth. As a baby and as a toddler, a child is primed as a 
social being. Once a child sets foot into the wider society as a teenager, its basic 
cultural orientation is firmly in place. This research stream has led to dimension 
models of culture. The most widely used of these is the five-dimension model by 
Hofstede [1]. The five dimensions are: 
− Identity: individualism versus collectivism.  Essentially this is the extent to 
which members of a society feel responsible for themselves and close relatives, 
The Influence of Culture on ABMP Negotiation Parameters      3 
or for the larger group they belong to, and feel the group to be responsible for 
them. 
− Hierarchy: large power distance versus small power distance, or the extent to 
which the less powerful members of a society expect and accept that power and 
rights are distributed unequally. 
− Aggression and gender: masculinity versus femininity. This dimension is about 
assertive dominance and emotional gender roles. A firm, competitive orienta-
tion, versus a consensus-seeking and care-taking orientation, for both women 
and men. 
− Otherness and truth: uncertainty avoidance versus uncertainty tolerance. In un-
certainty avoiding societies strict rules, rituals, and taboos govern life. Distinc-
tions should be sharp and the unknown is considered dangerous. 
− Gratification of needs: sort-term versus long-term orientation. In some societies 
immediate gratification of needs and keeping up social appearance, well-
behaving and respect for tradition are seen as virtues. In long-term oriented so-
cieties, reasoning is pragmatic and planning, foresight and perseverance are 
valued. 
Note that the five dimensions are not personality traits, but societal patterns! 
Also note that the picture drawn is necessarily simplified. It presents the two cari-
catured extremes of each dimension. In reality, almost all cultures have intermedi-
ate positions on almost all dimensions. Furthermore, the dimensions of culture can 
only be isolated from one another in an artificial way. The five dimensions are no 
more than abstractions that capture main behavioral trends. In reality, cultures 
have a recognizable feel to them, a Gestalt that can be described, albeit only 
roughly, by its combination of dimension scores. Experienced negotiators know 
the range of behaviors that they can expect from negotiators from other parts of 
the world. They also know how gender, age, status and personality can affect the 
negotiation style of people from these parts of the world. 
In [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], the influence of each of the dimensions on trade proc-
esses was modeled separately; a slightly artificial, but also necessary intermediate 
step to model agents differentiated along the Hofstede dimensions. This chapter 
describes a reconciled models of all dimensions and presents test runs with syn-
thetic and actual national culture. 
Negotiation Process Model 
The present work focuses on a specific type of negotiations: bilateral bargaining 
about business transactions. The work aims to develop models of actual human 
behavior. It does not aim to develop an optimal bargaining strategy that can out-
perform human negotiators or other agents. 
In bilateral negotiation, two parties aim at reaching a joint agreement. They do 
so by exchanging various offers or bids using e.g. an alternating offers protocol 
[10] called the “negotiation dance” in [11].  Negotiation is a complex emotional 
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decision-making process aiming to reach an agreement to exchange goods or ser-
vices [12].  
The literature on automated negotiation contains a number of agent models for 
negotiation. The focus of that literature is on reaching deals that are Pareto-
efficient (i.e., neither can improve without making the situation worse for the 
other). Furthermore, some aim at reaching fair outcomes, i.e., in which the deal is 
equally good for both parties. For more information on strategies see, e.g., [4], 
[13], [14], [15]. 
The context of the negotiation behavior modeled in this paper is formed by hu-
man gaming simulations. The gaming simulations are designed as tools in supply 
chains and networks research [16]. The multi-agent model aims to simulate human 
behavior in these games. Fig. 1 depicts the process model of an agent’s activities 
in the game. 
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Fig. 1. Processes and internal information flows of trading agents 
Participants can determine their trade goals, for instance to sell or to buy com-
modities of a particular quality level. They can select a trade partner according to 
their preferences and experience, negotiate a transaction of a commodity with 
quality attributes and guarantees, and deliver truthfully or defect. The essence of 
the game is information asymmetry: commodities have a quality attribute that is 
known to the seller and invisible – but testable at some cost – for the buyer. The 
buyer can either trust the seller’s quality statement or spend money on testing, or 
negotiate some kind of guarantee or certification, which will result in a higher 
price.  
The relevant attributes for comparing bids during the negotiation process are 
the economic value of the transaction according to market prices, the valuation of 
particular quality attributes by the trader, and the risk of deceit introduced by the 
information asymmetry.  
The valuations of quality and risk have a rational component and a subjective 
valuation that is influenced by a trader’s personal characteristics and culture. The 
rational component of a quality attribute is the difference in market price that a 
trader expects as a result of the quality difference. The rational component of the 
risk is the product of the amount of the damage and the probability that the dam-
age occurs. The subjective valuation comes in addition to the rational value. For 
quality, it is the trader’s quality preference, for instance because of the societal 
status that results from trading high quality products. For risk, it is an agent’s risk 
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aversion, a cost in excess of damage×probability, that a trader is willing to make 
in order to avoid risk. 
In the models developed in this work, traders are assumed to compare business 
proposals by applying a utility function as proposed by Tykhonov et al. [17]: 
UB = wvVB + wqQB + wrRB . (1) 
UB stands for the utility that agent a expects from bid b made by partner agent 
p.  
VB reflects a’s belief about the economic value of the transaction in the interval 
[0, 1]. It is calculated as the profit expected from the transaction in case of coop-
eration, minus the estimated risk of the trade partner to defect, computed as dam-
age×probability.  
QB reflects the subjective valuation of the quality attribute of the proposed 
transaction, in addition to the market value, in the interval [0, 1], e.g. a trader may 
prefer trading biologically grown food, even if more profit can be made trading 
traditionally grown.  
RB reflects a’s valuation of the risk involved in the interval [0, 1], with 1 repre-
senting no risk. It is based on the product of three factors, all normalized values in 
the interval [0, 1]. The first factor is a’s subjective estimate of the probability that 
p’s will defect. The second factor is the opportunity to defect that the contract 
leaves for p, e.g. a contract for organically grown food offers the opportunity to 
deliver the cheaper traditionally grown, but a contract for traditionally grown food 
does not. The third factor is the damage that a expects to suffer in case of defec-
tion by p, normalized in the interval [0, 1] with 1 representing maximal damage. 
RB is computed as the product of the three factors.  
The factors wv, wq, and wr, with wv+wq+wr=1, reflect the weight that agent a at-
taches to the terms of the utility function when dealing with p. For a rational 
agent, wq=wr=0. The values of wq and wr reflect an agent’s quality preference and 
risk aversion, and are to a great extent influenced by culture. Within a culturally 
homogeneous society, not all agents have equal preferences, but significant differ-
ences between cultures exist in the average values of risk aversion and the ap-
praisal of status associated with high quality products. 
Technical details of the utility function can be found in [18]. 
ABMP Negotiation Architecture 
For the agents’ negotiation strategy we chose the Agent-Based Market Place 
(ABMP) architecture of Jonker and Treur [4], because of its proven similarity to 
human negotiations [19] in experiments with the SAMIN system of which the 
bidding strategy is that of ABMP.  
The ABMP strategy is developed on the following principles. To assess a bid of 
the other party, it is important to have evaluation methods. Evaluation can be done 
at two levels: the level of each of the specific attributes (attribute evaluation), and 
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the level of the bid as a whole (overall bid utility). Thus, some characteristics of 
ABMP are: 
− explicit reasoning about the negotiation strategy and co-ordination of the nego-
tiation process; 
− evaluation of a bid takes into account both the attributes separately and the 
overall utility of the bid; 
− planning of a new bid takes into account both the overall utility level and the 
level of attributes separately. 
In particular, in the model it is possible to work on two levels: the level of the 
overall bid and the level of each of the attributes separately. The negotiation 
model has been specified as a compositional structure within the component Co-
operation Management of the agent, see Figure 2.  
 
bid utility 
determination
utility 
planning
attribute 
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negotiation 
coordination
attribute 
planning
cooperation management
 
Fig. 2. Multi-Attribute Negotiation Architecture 
Globally speaking, the process runs as follows: 
1. At the beginning of each negotiation round, evaluations of the attrib-
utes of the previous bids are determined. 
2. The evaluations are aggregated and the overall utilities are computed, 
both for the own previous bid of the agent and the proposed bid, re-
ceived from the opponent in the previous negotiation round. 
3. Decide whether to accept the opponent’s bid, quit the negotiation 
without a deal, or make a counteroffer. For a counter offer the next 
step is, step 4.  
4. The concession step to be made in the next bid is determined. For this, 
the agent determines the overall target utility for the next bid to be 
proposed to the opponent.  
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5. To obtain the next bid, given the target utility, first according to some 
distribution over attributes, target attribute evaluation values are de-
termined (chosen in such a manner that they aggregate exactly to the 
target utility). 
6. Finally, for each of these target attribute evaluation values, an attribute 
value is chosen that has an evaluation value as close as possible to the 
target evaluation value for the attribute 
An agent accepts another agent’s bid, unless: 
− Repetition of steps takes place: steps without enough progress (depending on 
the impatience factor (pi) which specifies the acceptable number of steps in 
which nothing changes) 
− A utility gap (larger than some threshold ω) remains; i.e., a significant differ-
ence between the utility of the own bid and that of the other agent's bid. 
− A configuration mismatch (larger than some threshold ν) remains between the 
own bid and the other agent's bid. 
Here a configuration mismatch means that for at least one attribute, between the 
two values (in the two bids) a significant difference exists. Depending on the out-
come of the analysis in step 2, component Negotiation Coordination decides on 
the next action (step 3). If a user is involved, the agent involves the user in the de-
cision process. If the agent is solely responsible for the negotiation, it decides for 
itself on one of the following actions: 
− Start a next negotiation round 
− Contact the user (to discuss whether the concession factor (γ) can be changed. 
− Contact the user to discuss whether the configuration tolerance (τ) can be 
changed. 
− Communicate to the user that an agreement has been reached. 
− Communicate to the user that the negotiation has failed (only when the user is 
unwilling to change the characteristics). 
One additional elementary aspect of the ABMP architecture is the determina-
tion of a concession step (step 4). This step characterizes a concession-based strat-
egy. The decision for what concession to make is based in ABMP on the concept 
of the current utility gap, i.e., the difference between the utility of the agent’s own 
bid, and the utility of the last bid of the opponent. It is important to note that in 
this computation both utilities are based on the agent’s own utility function. Thus, 
where the utility of the self (own) bid is the actual, true utility value, the utility of 
the opponent’s bid is typically only an approximation, since the opponent is typi-
cally not willing to share his utility function. This illustrates a key aspect of nego-
tiations with incomplete preference information (i.e., where the utility function of 
the opponent is unknown): the perceived remaining utility gap between the own 
and other’s offer may be very from the perspectives of the two parties. A conces-
sion made by one agent (in the way of decreasing his own utility function) may be 
perceived as no concession at all (even a retraction) by the other party. Similarly, 
an agent can make no concession (or a very small concession), but the opponent 
perceives this concession as very considerable. It is precisely this type of conces-
sions that one would like to achieve in multi-attribute negotiations, since it means 
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the new offer is closer to the Pareto-efficient frontier. Such concessions can only 
be achieved by finding suitable concession trade-offs between the issues. 
In ABMP the concession step CS is determined by 
CS = β (1 - µ / UBS) (UBO - UBS) . (2) 
In the above formula, UBS and UBO represent the utilities of self (i.e., the agent’s 
own bid), respectively the utility of the other’s last bid. The factor UBO - UBS ex-
presses the current utility gap. The letter µ stands for minimal utility, also known 
as reservation value. The factor β stands for the negotiation speed. The minimal 
utility is taken as µ = 1 - γ with γ the concession factor, expressing a measure in 
how far concessions can be made. The factor (1 - µ / UBS) expresses that the con-
cession step will decrease to 0 if the UBS approximates the minimal utility µ. This 
ensures UBS ≥ µ . 
Note that in step 4, the user is asked whether he is willing to adjust his conces-
sion factor. The rationale for this is that, in human negotiations, often the players 
do not know their true or absolute cut off value (minimal utility), but start working 
from a higher value. If it turns out that with that somewhat higher minimal value, 
they cannot close the deal, humans tend to adjust this minimal value closer to their 
true cut off value.  
The rest of the ABMP architecture is not explained in this paper, as it is not 
fundamental for understanding the current paper. For more details, the reader is re-
ferred to [4] and [20]. 
Culture and Bargaining 
[5], [6], [7], [8], and [9] model the influence of culture on trade processes for each 
of the five dimensions separately. Characteristic effects of the dimensions on ne-
gotiation behavior are cited below. 
Individualism versus collectivism 
According to [5], to a collectivistic trader, negotiation has to be preceded by the 
formation of a relationship. If that goes wrong there is no negotiation. During the 
negotiation, collectivistic traders discriminate between in-group and out-group 
partners. They try to maintain harmony as long as the opponent follows the in-
group rules. When doing business with individualist traders the collectivists may 
be shocked by their opponent's explicit communication. The style of the reaction 
may be furious, or they might never explicitly say anything, but just avoid the 
other from now on. In a collectivistic culture the responsibility for in-group wel-
fare and the compliance with in-group rules always play a prominent role. A col-
lectivist will accept benefits for his in-group rather than his personal advantage as 
a convincing argument.  
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Individualists have one thing in mind during negotiations: their personal inter-
est. So individualist traders are not very modest in their negotiations, nor will they 
give in for the purpose of maintaining harmony. If they are not aware of the cul-
tural differences when trading with collectivists, they may be upset by the lack of 
explicit communication, or they may upset their opponents by being too explicit, 
or by talking business before the relationship has been established and acknowl-
edged. They behave patiently as long as it serves their interest. 
Power distance 
According to [6], traders from egalitarian cultures may have different ways to ne-
gotiate, but they will always negotiate. Traders from large power distance cultures 
on the other hand are not used to negotiating seriously. The powerful dictate the 
conditions. A trader from a culture with large power distance expects a lower 
ranked business partner to accept his conditions rapidly. If the lower ranked part-
ner has the same cultural background, there is no problem and the rights of the 
higher ranked will be recognized and respected: the lower ranked will be modest 
and give in easily. However, a trader from an egalitarian culture may not give in to 
the pressure if his status is lower, but will either react furiously (e.g., break off ne-
gotiations) or simply ignore the pressure (make a counterproposal), in which case 
the opponent will be furious (and e.g., break off negotiations).  
Masculinity versus femininity 
[7] treat the dimension of masculinity versus femininity as a preference for per-
formance versus cooperation. A performance oriented trader (masculine culture) is 
interested in fast trades, with as many high quality goods as possible in one trade. 
This trader is rather impatient, and if bids are too far off from his profile, he will 
walk away quickly. The performance oriented sticks to the contract of the deal, 
deceive the trade partner to the limits of the contract without any compunction, 
and expects the partner to do so too.  
A cooperation oriented trader (feminine culture) is interested in the relationship 
with the trade partner; building trust is important. The amount or quality of goods 
is not of the most interest, because the relationship built during negotiation might 
pay off in future negotiations. Given the interest in the relationship with the trade 
partner, a first negotiation with a trade partner will take time that is willingly 
spent. During such negotiations, the trader appreciates a negotiation process in 
which both partners show a willingness to accommodate the other over time.  
Uncertainty avoidance 
According to [8], the first bid of an uncertainty avoiding trader tends to be modest 
in the sense that it is a price he thinks is right. Uncertainty avoiding traders have 
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an emotional style of negotiation, making sure that the opponents understand their 
feelings. They will not adapt their behavior to their opponent’s. In the bargaining 
that follows they will not easily give in nor will much time be spent. After a few 
unsuccessful iterations, the uncertainty avoiding trader will break off the negotia-
tion. 
Uncertainty tolerant traders on the other hand have a relaxed style of negotia-
tion. They try to adapt their behavior to their counterparts, although they are not 
prepared to come to an agreement at all cost. They do not show their emotions and 
may be disconcerted if their opponents do. They are careful not to be more yield-
ing than their counterparts are. 
Long term versus short term orientation 
According to [9], long term oriented negotiators are pragmatic and take the bigger 
picture. They tend to see one bargaining instance as a small step in a long process, 
and their decisions will be led by their estimation of the profitability or other suc-
cess chances of that longer process. Long-term oriented traders show patience. 
They do not break off negotiations. They do not overcharge. A first proposal may 
be modest, but they do not rapidly give in. 
Short term oriented negotiators, on the other hand, think in terms of moral prin-
ciples and apply them to the situation that is before them here and now. They are 
very reliable when it comes to following standards of appropriateness of behavior, 
but this can make them disregard the ulterior consequences of their action. 
Modeling Culture in ABMP 
Based on narrative descriptions acquired through an expert systems knowledge 
elicitation approach, [5], [6], [7], [8], and [9] propose formal models for the influ-
ence of the single dimensions on the  ABMP parameters, and for the weights that 
subjective terms for quality preference and risk aversion get in an agent’s utility 
evaluation. 
With respect to the influence of culture, the relevant ABMP parameters are 
concession factor, negotiation speed, utility gap size, and impatience factor. The 
concession factor determines how far the agent is willing to go in making conces-
sions. Negotiation speed determines the extent of concessions to its own utility the 
agent would typically make per negotiation round. The utility gap size expresses 
what is acceptable to the agent when comparing its own bid with that of the oppo-
nent. If the difference in utility falls within the utility gap size, the agent will ac-
cept the opponent’s offer. The impatience factor determines when the agent be-
comes impatient with the opponent. For example, for some agent it is OK if the 
other makes a concession within 4 rounds, for another, the opponent should make 
concessions every round.  
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Table 1. Influence of culture on the utility weight factors and ABMP parameters (+ in-
creased parameter value; - decreased; +! increased every negotiation round) [18] 
Culture type Relation wq wr γ β ω ι 
large power distance self status high +      
 self status low -      
 higher partner  + +  +! - 
 lower partner  -     
small power distance        
uncertainty avoiding similar partner + +  +  + 
 different partner + ++  +  + 
uncertainty tolerant        
individualistic        
collectivistic ingroup partner   +   - 
 outgroup partner  +  -   
masculine  + +  +  + 
feminine  -   -  - 
long-term oriented  -     - 
short-term oriented general +      
 high partners + - +   - 
 
[18] proposes a model that integrates the models of the single dimensions into a 
five-dimensional model of cultural influence. The basis for the integration is the 
table of cultural factors’ influences (Table 1).   
The modeling approach is as follows. Behavior is influenced by the cultural 
dimensions. These are represented by indices usually called PDI, UAI, IND, 
MAS, and LTO. We scale these indices to the interval [0, 1], 0 representing the 
lowest observed valuein surveys of national cultures, 1 the highest observed value, 
and indicate the scaled values by PDI*, UAI*, IND*, MAS*, and LTO*, respectively. 
So, IND* indicates the degree of individualism, 1-IND* indicates the degree of col-
lectivism.  
In addition to the indices, in some cultures relational characteristics are relevant 
to differentiate behavior. In cultures with high power distance, status of the agent 
and its opponent is relevant. In collectivistic cultures, in-group members are 
treated differently from out-group members. In uncertainty avoiding cultures, 
strangers are mistrusted. In short-term oriented cultures, celebrities and well-
respected members of society are treated with special attention. 
The combination of cultural indices and relational characteristics lead to the 
cultural factors represented in Table 1. These factors are modeled to have a mo-
notonous effect, either increasing or decreasing, on the relevant ABMP parameters 
and weight factors. As no further evidence is available, a simple approach is taken 
and the effects are assumed to be linear: from some default value to a minimal 
value if the resulting affect is negative; from the default value to a maximal value 
if the effect is positive: 
( ) ( )LTTHT xxxxxxxxxx −∆−∆+−∆+∆+= 22  . (3) 
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In the above equation xT represent the default value of parameter x, xH the maxi-
mal value, xL the minimal value, and ∆x the effect of joint cultural factors on x. 
The effects of the factors on a parameter are computed by subtracting the weak 
disjunction of the decreasing effects from the weak disjunction of the positive fac-
tors. So, positive effects cannot reinforce each other, negative effects cannot rein-
force each other, but the strongest negative effect can compensate for the strongest 
positive effect, vice versa. This can be illustrated by the effect of culture on the 
impatience parameter: 
{ }** ,max MASUAI=∆ι ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) 







−−
−−−
−
p
apap
sLTOLTOMAS
gINDssPDI
***
**
1,,1
,11,
max  . (4) 
In this equation sa and sp represent the agent’s beliefs about own and partner’s 
societal status, respectively, and gap represent a’s belief about group distance with 
p . Effects on other parameters are computed similarly, using Table 1. 
Test Runs with Synthetic Cultures 
Table 2 presents results of simulated negotiations, applying Jonker and Treur’s 
ABMP architecture [4]. The negotiations are performed in the simulation envi-
ronment for of commercial transactions, applied in [6], [7], [8], and [9]. The 
agents are assigned roles of either suppliers or customers. Agents may select a 
partner in the opposite role and negotiate about the sale of a commodity that has 
either high or basic quality. However, quality is not visible without third-party 
testing, so the buyer of a high quality product has to accept risk, i.e. trust the 
seller. In the current simulation, agents are neutral with respect to trust, i.e. neither 
trust nor distrust their trade partners. If they agree on high quality, they implicitly 
accept the risk of deceit. The percentage of high quality transactions reflects the 
level of risk that the agents are willing to take. It should be noted that the results 
are not tuned to realistic situations. The figures should not be taken as absolute 
values. They show tendencies that emerge from the model. 
The results in Table 2 show that in a hierarchical agent society, negotiations 
succeed more frequently if there is status difference: the higher ranking force the 
transaction and take risk (high rate of high quality transactions) or force the lower 
ranking to do so.  Egalitarian agents do not accept the risk of deceit. 
In uncertainty avoiding agent societies, negotiations fail frequently if the part-
ner is different, i.e. partners do not have common group membership. Negotiations 
are broken off after a few rounds, because the uncertainty avoiding agents have an 
urge to proceed (“time is money”). They have a strong preference for high quality 
commodities. They are willing to take a calculated risk to that end, but only with 
familiar partners.  The uncertainty tolerant agents are more balanced in their 
judgment of transaction value and risk.  
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Table 2.  Results of simulated negotiations for extreme settings of culture parameters, i.e. 
the value for the particular dimension is set to either 0.1 or 0.9, the values for the other di-
mensions are set to 0.5. Default values of parameters wq, wr, , γ, ω, β, and ι are set to 0.2, 
0.1, 0.7, 0.2, 0.02, and 0.4, respectively; T: number of successful transactions; P: number of 
failed negotiations; P: percentage of negotions failed; R: average duration in rounds; Q: 
percentage of transactions with high quality 
Culture type Relation T F P R Q 
large power distance all status high 56 38 40 3.6 24 
 all status low 60 41 41 3.2 0 
 higher buyers 61 33 35 3.3 25 
 higher sellers 76 39 34 3.1 25 
small power distance  58 56 49 3.2 2 
uncertainty avoiding different partners 39 85 69 2.6 0 
 similar partners 65 46 41 2.9 22 
uncertainty tolerant  48 76 61 2.9 1 
individualistic  56 63 53 3.0 0 
collectivistic ingroup partners 81 23 22 3.4 14 
 outgroup partners 35 77 69 3.1 0 
masculine  57 55 49 3.0 18 
feminine  48 43 47 3.7 10 
long-term oriented  71 27 28 3.6 16 
short-term oriented general 40 72 64 3.1 13 
 high partners 68 51 43 3.0 13 
 
Individualistic agents also do not accept proposals that have too little value or 
too much risk. Collectivistic agents fail more frequently if they negotiate with out-
group partners. With in-group partners, they take their time to negotiate and accept 
the risk of deceit.  
Masculine agents are impatient, break-off frequently, and go for high quality. 
Feminine agents try to finish the negotiations and take their time for it. Neverthe-
less, they do not succeed more frequently, because the step size of their conces-
sions is too small. 
Long term oriented agents show patience in their negotiations and frequently 
succeed, but they do not accept risk. Yet they accept high quality transactions,  
because they take their time to negotiate a price that covers the risk. The sort term 
oriented are less patient and break off more frequently, but this effect is reduced  
when they trade with high status partners. They accept risk if they are trading high 
quality products. 
These results comply with the expected behavior of the agents and verify the 
implementation. However, they do not validate that the implemented model gen-
erates believable culturally differentiated agent behavior. For validation of the 
model, results of extensive simulations with realistic values of cultural parameters 
should be compared with empirical results from literature. A host of literature on 
negotiation in particular countries is available, for instance Adair et al. [21] com-
pare negotiations  in France, Russia, Japan, Hong Kong, Brazil, and the United 
States; Kumar and Worm [22] compare negotiations in China and India. 
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Table 3. Example cultures used in simulations 
culture PDI* UAI* IDV* MAS* LTO* 
1 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.3 
2 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.9 
3 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 
4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 
Table 4. Example results of a simulation run with default parameter settings as in Table 2 
and cultures from Table 3 
customer culture variable  supplier 
culture  1 2 3 4 
Successful transactions 1 61 45 37 69 
 2 65 90 37 53 
 3 49 56 59 63 
 4 58 61 39 69 
      
Percentage failed 1 49 57 69 43 
 2 45 17 70 41 
 3 61 47 51 41 
 4 41 41 66 32 
      
Performance 1) 1  0.00 0.08 0.05 
 2 0.06  0.09 0.10 
 3 0.02 -0.07  0.02 
 4 0.11 0.05 0.07  
1) Performance is computed as average normalized price minus average normalized quality. 
A high value is an advantage for the suppliers; a low value is advantage for the customers. 
 
The remaining part of this section presents an example of data generated by the 
model. An agent society of 8 suppliers and 8 customers is given time to trade and 
negotiate about approximately 100 transactions. All suppliers have equal cultural 
settings and all customers have equal settings. If agents have equal cultural set-
tings, they are considered in-group. All agents have equal status. Table 3 displays 
the cultural settings. Culture 1 is modeled after North-American cultures,  culture 
2 is inspired by China, culture 3 by East-European cultures and culture 4 has simi-
larity with India. Table 4 presents results of the simulations. The results in table 4 
demonstrate that in the simulation model, the cultural dimension parameters have 
their influence. They differentiate aggregate performance in mono-cultural set-
tings as well as in intercultural interactions. However, extensive validation is re-
quired on the basis of culture and negotiation literature and experimental data. 
This paper does not cover such validation. It is subject of the authors’ current re-
search. 
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Test Runs with Actual National Cultures 
Tests have been run with agents configured with actual national cultures. For this 
purpose, a dataset of cultural dimensions of 62 countries was used (subset of a 
dataset prepared for a new edition of [2], to appear in 2010). For these cultures, 
the effect on ABMP parameters can be calculated, for sight validation of the pa-
rameter adaptations resulting from Table 1. The effects are presented in the Ap-
pendix (Table 6).  
For all test runs, the agents were configured homogeneously with the parameter 
values presented in the Appendix (Table 7). All runs were replicated 10 times. The 
average results are presented in Table 8 in the Appendix. It should be noted that 
these results represent modeled behavior in a game, not in actual trade. The results 
show the number of successful transactions, regardless the profitability of the 
transactions.  
The results show that the model can generate differentiation of behavior in 
trade for realistic cultural configurations. The effects on different observables, e.g. 
failure rate and average negotiation duration, are different across cultures. How-
ever, more data are required for a thorough analysis, for instance varying the 
group distance and status differences between agents. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
It is well-known  that negotiation outcomes differ across the world and that people 
from different countries differ with respect to the way they negotiate and the re-
sults they obtain [23]. Kumar and Worm [22] relate differences in business nego-
tiation processes  with differences in economic institutions. According to Hofstede 
[1], the efficiency of different organizational structures and institutions depend on 
culture. There is ubiquitous evidence that the result of decision making in business 
is influenced by the cultural background of the decision makers. As a conse-
quence, realistic business simulation models of international supply chains and 
networks that take the interaction between business partners into account, should 
incorporate culture. 
Culturally differentiated behavior is not relevant in agent-to-agent negotiations, 
or other situations where the main purpose of application of intelligent agents is to 
outperform people by rational decision making, like advocated by Raiffa [11]. 
Culturally differentiated negotiating agents are useful in a context where human 
factors play a role. Social simulation is an example of such a context. [17] report a 
multi-agent simulation that is intended for use in combination with a gaming 
simulation, as a data gathering tool in supply chain research. Other application 
area’s may be training and education, and decision support systems for human ne-
gotiations.  
This paper contributes to the understanding of culture’s influence on decision 
making in business by exploring the feasibility of Hofstede’s five-dimensional 
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model to simulate believable agents in business. The model has been tested on  
imaginary cultures that differ on only one of the dimensions.  
Data sets have been generated on the basis of actual national cultures. These 
data show relations between cultural configuration and the simulated frequency of 
transactions, negotiation failure ratio, duration of negotiation, quality level of 
traded commodities, and certification level. The results provide some face validity 
of the simulations, but a deeper analysis on more data is required to reveal rela-
tions in the results that can be validated. 
Preliminary results of the simulation of more complex, reality-based cultures 
give evidence that culture in agents can be simulated by applying Hofstede’s 
model, as was originally suggested by de Rosis et al. [24]. However, extensive 
validations remain for future research. A first source of validation data are the 
numerous papers reporting differences in negotiations across cultures, e.g. [21]. 
Gaming simulations like [17] could be used as a tool to collect data for more pre-
cise tuning of the model. 
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Appendix 
Table 5.  Effects of culture on ABMP parameters based on Table 1 for a sample of 62 
countries, computed for group distance 0.5, supplier status 0.3, and customer status 0.7 
national culture (PDI, IDV, MAS, UAI, LTO) ∆wq ∆wr ∆γ ∆β ∆ω ∆ι 
Argentina  (49, 46, 56, 86, 20) 0.42 0.30 0.56 0.42 0.20 0.30 
Australia  (36, 90, 61, 51, 21) 0.40 0.06 0.55 0.22 0.14 0.06 
Austria  (11, 55, 79, 70, 60) 0.19 0.51 0.28 0.57 0.04 0.19 
Bangladesh  (80, 20, 55, 55, 47) -0.01 0.18 0.40 0.10 0.32 0.08 
Brazil  (69, 38, 49, 76, 44) 0.25 0.37 0.39 0.25 0.28 0.25 
Bulgaria  (70, 30, 40, 85, 69) 0.16 0.63 0.35 0.25 0.28 0.16 
Canada  (39, 80, 52, 48, 36) 0.16 0.07 0.45 0.04 0.16 0.04 
China  (80, 20, 66, 30, 87) -0.21 0.57 0.40 0.26 0.32 -0.21 
Chile  (63, 23, 28, 86, 31) 0.14 0.38 0.48 0.14 0.25 0.14 
Colombia  (67, 13, 64, 80, 13) 0.40 0.19 0.61 0.37 0.27 0.19 
Croatia  (73, 33, 40, 80, 58) 0.20 0.51 0.34 0.20 0.29 0.20 
Czech Republic  (57, 58, 57, 74, 70) 0.04 0.53 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.04 
Denmark  (18, 74, 16, 23, 35) -0.19 -0.12 0.46 -0.61 0.07 -0.61 
Estonia  (40, 60, 30, 60, 82) -0.22 0.47 0.20 -0.10 0.16 -0.22 
Finland  (33, 63, 26, 59, 38) -0.12 0.16 0.43 -0.15 0.13 -0.15 
France  (68, 71, 43, 86, 63) 0.23 0.60 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.23 
Great Britain  (35, 89, 66, 35, 51) 0.15 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.14 0.15 
Germany  (35, 67, 66, 65, 83) -0.17 0.54 0.17 0.32 0.14 -0.17 
Greece  (60, 35, 57, 112, 45) 0.55 0.62 0.39 0.57 0.24 0.55 
Hong Kong  (68, 25, 57, 29, 61) -0.04 0.30 0.38 0.14 0.27 -0.04 
Hungary  (46, 80, 88, 82, 58) 0.30 0.59 0.29 0.76 0.18 0.30 
Indonesia  (78, 14, 46, 48, 62) -0.14 0.22 0.43 -0.06 0.31 -0.14 
India  (77, 48, 56, 40, 51) 0.02 0.22 0.34 0.12 0.31 0.05 
Iran  (58, 41, 43, 59, 14) 0.29 -0.01 0.60 0.02 0.23 -0.01 
Ireland  (28, 70, 68, 35, 24) 0.44 0.15 0.53 0.36 0.11 0.15 
Israel  (13, 54, 47, 81, 38) 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.28 0.05 0.28 
Italy  (50, 76, 70, 75, 61) 0.14 0.48 0.27 0.45 0.20 0.14 
Japan  (54, 46, 95, 92, 88) 0.07 0.87 0.27 0.68 0.22 0.07 
Korea South  (60, 18, 39, 85, 100) -0.15 0.85 0.41 0.24 0.24 -0.15 
Latvia  (44, 70, 9, 63, 69) -0.28 0.41 0.22 -0.28 0.18 -0.28 
Lithuania  (42, 60, 19, 65, 82) -0.17 0.52 0.20 -0.16 0.17 -0.17 
Luxembourg  (40, 60, 50, 70, 64) 0.06 0.45 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.06 
Malaysia  (104, 26, 50, 36, 41) -0.11 0.09 0.41 0.00 0.40 0.00 
Mexico  (81, 30, 69, 82, 24) 0.25 0.29 0.53 0.47 0.32 0.29 
Malta  (56, 59, 47, 96, 47) 0.43 0.59 0.37 0.43 0.22 0.43 
Morocco  (70, 46, 53, 68, 14) 0.37 0.08 0.60 0.21 0.28 0.08 
Netherlands  (38, 80, 14, 53, 67) -0.33 0.30 0.23 -0.33 0.15 -0.33 
Norway  (31, 69, 8, 50, 35) -0.27 0.05 0.46 -0.42 0.12 -0.42 
New Zealand  (22, 79, 58, 49, 33) 0.25 0.11 0.47 0.16 0.09 0.11 
Pakistan  (55, 14, 50, 70, 50) 0.20 0.35 0.43 0.20 0.22 0.20 
Peru  (64, 16, 42, 87, 25) 0.29 0.35 0.53 0.29 0.26 0.29 
Philippines  (94, 32, 64, 44, 27) 0.07 0.13 0.51 0.28 0.38 0.13 
Poland  (68, 60, 64, 93, 38) 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.27 0.50 
Portugal  (63, 27, 31, 104, 28) 0.31 0.50 0.50 0.31 0.25 0.31 
Romania  (90, 30, 42, 90, 52) 0.27 0.56 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.32 
Russia  (93, 39, 36, 95, 81) 0.14 0.82 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.14 
South Africa  (49, 65, 83, 49, 34) 0.49 0.37 0.46 0.66 0.20 0.37 
El Salvador  (66, 19, 40, 94, 20) 0.34 0.38 0.56 0.34 0.26 0.34 
Serbia  (86, 25, 43, 92, 52) 0.32 0.58 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.35 
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Singapore  (74, 20, 48, 8, 72) -0.24 0.28 0.40 -0.04 0.30 -0.24 
Slovak Republic  (104, 52, 110, 51, 77) 0.23 0.84 0.40 0.76 0.40 0.23 
Slovenia  (71, 27, 19, 88, 49) 0.07 0.52 0.37 0.07 0.28 0.07 
Spain  (57, 51, 42, 86, 48) 0.28 0.50 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.28 
Sweden  (31, 71, 5, 29, 53) -0.48 0.05 0.33 -0.66 0.12 -0.66 
Taiwan  (58, 17, 45, 69, 93) -0.24 0.64 0.42 0.14 0.23 -0.24 
Thailand  (64, 20, 34, 64, 32) 0.02 0.16 0.48 -0.02 0.26 -0.02 
Trinidad and Tobago  (47, 16, 58, 55, 13) 0.45 -0.03 0.61 0.16 0.19 -0.03 
Turkey  (66, 37, 45, 85, 46) 0.30 0.47 0.38 0.30 0.26 0.30 
Uruguay  (61, 36, 38, 100, 26) 0.38 0.48 0.52 0.38 0.24 0.38 
U.S.A.  (40, 91, 62, 46, 26) 0.36 0.10 0.52 0.24 0.16 0.10 
Venezuela  (81, 12, 73, 76, 16) 0.27 0.17 0.59 0.32 0.32 0.17 
Vietnam  (70, 20, 40, 30, 57) -0.17 0.10 0.40 -0.20 0.28 -0.20 
 
Table 6. Default and maximal and minimal values used for cultural adaptations in Table 7 
 wq wr γ β ω ι 
default xT 0.05 0.05 0.6 0.3 0.02 0.3 
maximum xH 0.2 0.2 1 0.5 0.1 0 
minimum xL 0 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 1 
[the increase of ω depends on round number ρ : ∆ω=PDI*(sp-sa)ρ ]; 
[the effect of  ι=1 is that the probability of quitting a negotiation in case of insufficient pro-
gress or unrealistic bidding equals 0.5: P(quit) = 0.5ι ] 
Table 7. Average results of 10 simulation runs with 8 supplier agents and 8 buyer agents, 
with group distance 0.5, supplier status 0.3 and customer status 0.7; T: number of success-
ful transactions; P: number of failed negotiations; P: percentage of negotions failed; R: av-
erage duration in rounds; Q: percentage of transactions with high quality; C: percentage of 
certified transactions 
national culture (PDI, IDV, MAS, UAI, LTO) T F P R Q C 
Argentina  (49, 46, 56, 86, 20) 56 36 39 3.1 34 7 
Australia  (36, 90, 61, 51, 21) 70 25 26 4.3 30 5 
Austria  (11, 55, 79, 70, 60) 60 41 41 4.0 25 4 
Bangladesh  (80, 20, 55, 55, 47) 68 38 36 3.6 26 5 
Brazil  (69, 38, 49, 76, 44) 65 26 29 3.8 34 5 
Bulgaria  (70, 30, 40, 85, 69) 56 33 37 3.3 37 3 
Canada  (39, 80, 52, 48, 36) 62 33 35 3.8 34 8 
China  (80, 20, 66, 30, 87) 87 15 15 4.2 20 2 
Chile  (63, 23, 28, 86, 31) 75 18 19 4.1 39 7 
Colombia  (67, 13, 64, 80, 13) 83 30 27 3.4 46 7 
Croatia  (73, 33, 40, 80, 58) 58 37 39 3.5 28 5 
Czech Republic  (57, 58, 57, 74, 70) 60 27 31 4.2 23 4 
Denmark  (18, 74, 16, 23, 35) 58 14 19 5.3 7 1 
Estonia  (40, 60, 30, 60, 82) 71 20 22 4.7 11 2 
Finland  (33, 63, 26, 59, 38) 69 16 19 4.5 23 5 
France  (68, 71, 43, 86, 63) 63 35 36 3.2 21 0 
Great Britain  (35, 89, 66, 35, 51) 70 51 42 4.0 27 0 
Germany  (35, 67, 66, 65, 83) 73 26 26 4.3 19 1 
Greece  (60, 35, 57, 112, 45) 54 38 41 3.0 41 9 
Hong Kong  (68, 25, 57, 29, 61) 68 31 31 3.8 24 3 
Hungary  (46, 80, 88, 82, 58) 62 27 30 3.6 23 5 
Indonesia  (78, 14, 46, 48, 62) 77 25 25 4.4 27 6 
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India  (77, 48, 56, 40, 51) 63 26 29 3.5 32 9 
Iran  (58, 41, 43, 59, 14) 71 22 24 4.0 42 7 
Ireland  (28, 70, 68, 35, 24) 67 30 31 4.4 31 5 
Israel  (13, 54, 47, 81, 38) 52 38 42 3.2 27 5 
Italy  (50, 76, 70, 75, 61) 53 34 39 3.7 26 6 
Japan  (54, 46, 95, 92, 88) 67 36 35 3.8 15 2 
Korea South  (60, 18, 39, 85, 100) 79 16 17 4.2 20 2 
Latvia  (44, 70, 9, 63, 69) 56 33 37 4.2 12 0 
Lithuania  (42, 60, 19, 65, 82) 64 31 33 4.5 19 1 
Luxembourg  (40, 60, 50, 70, 64) 67 30 31 4.0 18 2 
Malaysia  (104, 26, 50, 36, 41) 60 41 41 3.6 32 2 
Mexico  (81, 30, 69, 82, 24) 55 45 45 3.1 47 11 
Malta  (56, 59, 47, 96, 47) 59 35 37 3.2 24 2 
Morocco  (70, 46, 53, 68, 14) 65 20 24 3.6 35 2 
Netherlands  (38, 80, 14, 53, 67) 46 31 40 5.2 17 0 
Norway  (31, 69, 8, 50, 35) 66 24 27 5.3 15 4 
New Zealand  (22, 79, 58, 49, 33) 66 40 38 4.2 21 4 
Pakistan  (55, 14, 50, 70, 50) 72 17 19 4.1 29 6 
Peru  (64, 16, 42, 87, 25) 79 24 23 3.5 32 2 
Philippines  (94, 32, 64, 44, 27) 69 31 31 3.8 42 12 
Poland  (68, 60, 64, 93, 38) 41 45 52 2.5 54 19 
Portugal  (63, 27, 31, 104, 28) 63 31 33 3.4 33 5 
Romania  (90, 30, 42, 90, 52) 68 26 28 3.4 37 7 
Russia  (93, 39, 36, 95, 81) 70 27 28 3.3 29 6 
South Africa  (49, 65, 83, 49, 34) 67 37 36 3.8 36 7 
El Salvador  (66, 19, 40, 94, 20) 69 35 34 3.7 36 4 
Serbia  (86, 25, 43, 92, 52) 56 43 43 3.3 52 5 
Singapore  (74, 20, 48, 8, 72) 75 17 18 4.2 20 5 
Slovak Republic  (104, 52, 110, 51, 77) 75 17 18 3.5 24 4 
Slovenia  (71, 27, 19, 88, 49) 71 33 32 4.2 32 4 
Spain  (57, 51, 42, 86, 48) 61 22 27 4.0 26 1 
Sweden  (31, 71, 5, 29, 53) 51 10 16 7.3 4 1 
Taiwan  (58, 17, 45, 69, 93) 82 10 11 4.2 28 4 
Thailand  (64, 20, 34, 64, 32) 66 38 37 3.5 35 4 
Trinidad and Tobago  (47, 16, 58, 55, 13) 80 16 17 4.0 42 10 
Turkey  (66, 37, 45, 85, 46) 58 25 30 3.7 38 9 
Uruguay  (61, 36, 38, 100, 26) 50 33 40 3.1 26 9 
U.S.A.  (40, 91, 62, 46, 26) 72 27 27 4.4 40 4 
Venezuela  (81, 12, 73, 76, 16) 75 24 24 3.6 39 5 
Vietnam  (70, 20, 40, 30, 57) 69 22 24 4.4 22 8 
 
